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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH by and through its 
ROAD COMMISSION; H. J. COR-
LEISSEN, Chairman, LAY T 0 N 
MAXFIELD and LORENZO J. 
BOTT, members of the State Road 
Commission, 
vs. 
PlaintifL 
Appellant) 
BRACK HOWARD NOBLE and ANN 
C. NOBLE, his wife; ELMO ENG-
LAND; E. J. HUBER; and PACIF-
IC NATIONAL LIFE ASSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendants) 
Respondent. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 8544 
The Respondents do not fully agree with the statement 
of facts set forth by the Appellants, and to avoid repitition, 
will set forth any differences in statement of facts and any 
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supplemental statement of facts by reference to the witness's 
testimony as patterned by the Appellant's brief. 
Mr. Richards, the engineer, who had cross-sectioned 
the Defendants' property according to good engineering 
practice, and who had supervised the drilling operations, 
gave his estimates of the quantity and quality of the mater-
ial both sand and gravel as set forth in appellant's brief. 
After Mr. Richards admitted that he did not know the exact 
composition of the materials under gound, Mr. Budge asked, 
"This gravel business is pretty much like gold 
mining, you don't know what is there until you get 
there; is that correct?" 
and Mr. Richards replied, 
"That is right". (R. 212). 
On redirect examination, Mr. Richards stated that he had 
examined the results of the drilling of 4 holes on Defendants' 
property and of a fifth hole placed on the south boundary of 
the Defendants' property, and also had examined adjoining 
properties on which there had been excavation, (R. 213 and 
214) ; and the witness stated that his figures as given, were 
conservative, (R. 214). The witness had prepared Exhibit 2, 
which is a map of the Defendants' property showing the 
sand and gravel pits and showing that the plan of operation 
would be to excavate the property immediately East of the 
highway for a distance of 190 feet East, only to the level of 
the highway, in order to preserve the commercial character 
of that property, and then commencing 190 feet East of the 
highway the propery could be excavated below the level of 
the highway by leaving a one and one-half to one slope to 
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hold the bank on the commercial property (R. 119); witness 
testified that from the drilling of test holes as designated by 
the witness, the witness was able to prepare the cross section 
showing the sand and gravel materials on the Defendants' 
property, and that exhibits 3 and 4 are cross sections pre-
pared by the witness, (R. 117). The witness, Mr. Richards, 
testified that he is a partner in the firm of Caldwell, Richards 
and Sorensen, and during the course of the past 17 years 
has had many occasions to cross section land to determine 
quantities and qualities of material, and included among his 
clients are Interstate Brick Co. and many municipalities, 
(R. 113). 
The second witness, one of the Defendants, Brack 
Howard Noble, before identifying the colored photos exhib-
its No. 28 through 41 to which the Appellants objected, 
identified Exhibits No. 21 through 27, which are 8 x 10 black 
and white photo prints showing the Defendants' home, trail-
er court, antique shop and surroundings, and these black 
and white prints were admitted without objection, (R. 147). 
Exhibits 21 through 27 which are the black and white prints 
are essentially the same scenes as exhibits 28 through 41, 
the colored photos. The witness stated that the colored 
photos represented a true picture except for the tinted trees, 
(R. 148) and a purplish tint on some objects in the photo. 
Jury were given both the black and white prints and the 
colored prints to compare in light of the objection of Appel-
lant's counsel that the colored photos did not represent a true 
picture. Mr. Noble testified that he had a lease on the tract 
of land running 200 feet East of his tract from North Salt 
Lake giving him the right to excavate sand and gravel upon 
the tract next adjoining his tract on the east, ( R. 159). The 
witness testified that he conducted a trailer COlTt business 
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and antique business along the frontage of the highway for 
a depth of about 190 feet East of the highway, (R. 152), and 
that the property east of 190 feet from the highway was 
used for sand and gravel business, (R. 153), and the witness 
made a detailed explanation of each of his uses of the pro-
perties namely antique business, trailer court business, and 
sand and gravel business, as well as the location of his dwel-
ling. The witness stated that in his opinion, his property, 
taking in to consideration the three business uses to which it 
was being put and for which it was reasonably adapted was 
at least $300,000.00 (R. 163 and 164). Upon cross examina-
tion, the witness was shown Appellant's exhibits No. 44 
through 50 which are 5 x 7 black and white photo prints, 
and the witness acknowledged that the pictures were repre-
sentative of his property about July 22, 1955, (R. 184). Mr. 
Noble testified that of the $300,000.00 value he placed upon 
the property, the sand and gravel would be worth about 
$200,000.00 (R. 168) ; that the home was worth about 
$15,000.00 (R. 178) ; the antique building was worth about 
$3,000.00 (R. 179); that the laundry room, etc., for the 
trailer courts was worth about $8,000.00 (R. 180) ; that the 
sewer system was worth between $4,000.00 and $5,000.00; 
the lighting system was worth $2,000.00 (R. 180); and that 
the frontage property for a depth of 190 feet East of the 
highway was worth $75.00 or $80.00 a front foot (R.190). 
The witness stated that he had only had his sand pit open 
for 2 years and that the market was rapidly growing (R. 194 
and 195). 
Don R. Bass, the driller for Boyle Bros. Drilling Co., 
(R. 196), testified that he drilled four holes at places des-
ignated by the engineer. That the holes were drilled by use 
of a core barrel, (R. 197), which permits the taking of sam-
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pies as the drilling progresses, and the samples so selected 
are not contaminated by outside material or material from 
other depths, (R. 198) ; the witness then identified exhibits 
No. 6 through 16 which were eleven cardboard boxes con-
taining samples of material from each of the four test holes 
and each box was divided into compartments containing 
material from stated depths in each hole, (R. 199 toR. 201); 
upon cross examination, the witness testified that he had 
drilled many gravel properties and that all of his drilling 
was for the purpose of obtaining samples for examination 
and that four test holes drilled upon the Defendant's prop-
erty were sufficient for finding out what is on the property, 
(R. 203) ; that some of the holes drilled were about 40 feet 
below the level of the highway, and at no time did the wit-
ness encounter water or large boulders, (R. 207). That sub-
sequent drilling on adjoining property 200 feet south of the 
Defendant's property, and approximately south of hole No. 
1 of exhibit No. 2 he found the same material as on the 
Defendant's property, and he inspected recent excavation 
made in connection with the road building which shows that 
the same material exists throughout the vicinity of holes No. 
1, 2 and 3. 
Mr. Schoenfeld testified that he had been running sand 
and gravel pit operations since 1934 in North Salt Lake, and 
during this period has had an occasion to open and develop 
three pits, and that he recently had an operation which 
joined the Defendants' property on the north side, (R. 217) ; 
the witness was well acquainted with the Defendants' prop-
erty and that the Defendants' property was about the same 
as the witness' property, (R. 218); that the type of material 
on the witness' property commencing at the highway and 
extending East to where the abrutJt hill begins is all straight 
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sand with no gravel in it at all for a depth of at least 20 to 
25 feet below the level of the highway, which was as far as 
he had gone; the witness identified material contained in ex-
hibit No. 10 which he stated was what he called muck sand, 
and which material was no different from the material on 
the witness' own property, (R. 219). The sand material 
below did not need any further processing, but the material 
on the hill which was sand and gravel could be used as fill 
material without processing, but could be used for concrete 
if processed, (R. 220); the fine sand which he called muck 
sand was in largest demand for asphalt plants, but could 
also be used as plaster sand or brick sand as well as for fill 
material around special tanks, and sewer jobs, (R. 220); 
that the witness sold the fine sand for 75¢ per yard at the 
plant site, after loading at a cost of about 10¢ per yard, (R. 
221); that the muck sand was worth 25¢ a ton in place, and 
the other material would be worth 10¢ a ton in place, (R. 
222); the witness stated that the location of the Noble Pro-
erty with respect to highway projects and other use in the 
vicinity made the Noble property valuable by the saving in 
haulage since hauling costs were from five to ten cents per 
ton-mile. The other sources of supply were East Bountiful, 
which required about 7 miles more hauling and the point of 
the mountain in South Salt Lake County which was even 
farther from the market, (R. 225). By reason of the limited 
supply and the heavier market for fine sand, the witness 
believed that within 3 years there will be no source of supply 
from the north of fine sand, and the next closest source 
would be the point of the mountain, (R. 226); that the fine 
sand delivered at 90¢ per ton would cost 35¢ for loading and 
hauling, leaving a gross profit of 55¢ per ton (R. 227). Upon 
cross examination, the witness stated that the Defendants' 
property was the closest point to the asphalt plants where 
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most of the muck sand goes, (R. 235); that there is a great 
demand for the other fill rna terial for building on the 
west side of Salt Lake, all of which must be filled before it 
can be built on, (R. 236). Upon redirect examination, (R. 
236), the witness stated that he would be willing to pay Mr. 
Noble 25¢ a ton for the muck sand in place even though he is 
leasing land at 10¢ per ton for the reason that the property 
he is leasing at 10¢ a ton requires earth removal, cleaning 
and processing, whereas the muck sand on the Noble prop-
erty is ready for loading. The witness stated that under a 
prior lease, he had muck sand in a place similar to the Noble 
muck sand for which he was paying 10¢ per ton, but he had 
entered this lease in 1947, and at the time he entered the 
lease he still had to do the surface stripping (R. 237). 
Mr. Joseph P. Howa, the Civil Engineer, testified that 
he prepared blue prints of the improvements on the Defend-
ants' property showing the buildings, retaining walls and 
other improvements (R. 246). He testified as to the sizes of 
the various improvements and the details of their construction 
(R. 247-248); and as to replacement costs of the various im-
provements, and arrived at a total replacement value of 
$44,795.00. He was of the opinion that the total depreciation 
was $4,000.00 which would make a present value of improve-
ments of $40,795.00, (R.252-253). 
Mr. Gaddis testified that he had been engaged in real 
estate and investment business for 46 years, (R. 270); that 
he appraised the Defendants' property after the improve-
ments had been removed. He appraised the frontage proper-
ty for a depth of 190 feet at 75 dollars per foot. There being 
~'l5 feet frontage he valued that portion of the property at 
$44,625.00, (R. 272); then in response to the hypothetical 
q .:2stions placed, Mr. Gaddis gave the answers as set forth 
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in the appellant's brief; on cross examination the witness 
stated that while he was not a sand and gravel businessman, 
he depended upon experts to support his opinion as to value, 
(R. 279). 
Mr. Sherman Rideout testified in behalf of the Defend-
ant, (R.280), and stated that he had been in the real estate 
business for 27 years; that he appraised the Defendants' 
property about a week before the trial date, but the values at 
the time of appraisal were about the same as of June 22, 
1955, (R. 281); that the witness appraised the frontage 
property for a depth of about 200 feet which he considered a 
good depth for business property at $75.00 per front foot, 
making a total of $44,625.00, (R. 282) ; that as an appraiser, 
he must at sometimes base his appraisals upon the profes-
sional opinions of others; that assuming the quantity and 
quality of sand and gravel stated by the engineer, Mr. Rich-
ards, and the value of this material in place as stated by 
Mr. Schoenfeld and considering the replacement value of 
the property less depreciation as stated by the engineer Mr. 
Howa, (R. 283), and having seen pictures of the property 
offered in evidence, Exhibits 21 to 41 inclusive, (R. 284) 
and having seen the property from the street practically 
every month during the past four or five years, and being 
generally acquainted with the businesses carried on on the 
property, the fair market value of the property was 
$270,000.00, (R. 286-287) ; the witness was asked to base 
his opinion upon the idea that a fair market value of the 
property is what a willing buyer who had the means to do so 
and who wasn't under pressure, would pay to a willing sel-
ler who desired to sell his property, and wasn't under pres-
ure to sell it, (R. 285). 
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Douglas F. Larsen, the Materials Engineer for the Utah 
State Road Commission testified that there was drilled under 
his supervision 4 holes, ( R. 322 and 341) ; one of the holes 
was drilled with an 18 inch auger which is only capable of 
going to a depth of 20 feet, (R. 340); the material obtained 
by the drilling was tested for fineness and all of it would 
pass through a %, inch sieve, 99.8 per cent would pass a 3fs 
inch sieve, (R. 322); the witness testified that materials 
passing a No. 40 sieve or smaller would be considered fine 
sand, (R. 337); and that 94.3 per cent of the material tested 
passed the No. 40 sieve, (R. 323). 
The witness, Mr. Knowlton, called by the State as an 
expert in sand and gravel classified muck sand as being as 
fine as fine dirt, and that blending sand would be somewhat 
larger in its grains, (R.343); then upon cross examination, 
(R. 357), the witness stated that they acquire their muck 
sand from a process as a waste rna terial, and they do not 
have any bed of muck sand, so that the material the witness 
calls muck sand was just the washout waste from the clean-
ing of other sands and gravels; that this material which he 
called muck sand, he sells for 30¢ a ton loaded on the trucks; 
that: 
"Q. Is that muck sand you sell for 30 cents a ton 
anything like the sand on Noble's property? 
A. Well, it is not identical with it by a long ways; 
there is some blending sand on Noble's property. 
Q. Have you inspected the sand on the property 
immediately north of the noble property that was 
leased by Schoenfeld? 
A. In a general way. I never made a minute exam-
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ination of it. 
Q. Do you know whether there is any difference 
between the sand on the property of Schoenfeld and 
the Noble's property? 
A. I won't attempt to make an accurate compar-
ative classification. 
Q. Well, have you ever examined them to deter-
mine whether there is any similarity or difference? 
A. Yes, I have. That is, certain layers I have. 
Q. Now Mr. Schoenfeld testified that the material 
on his sand area, that he called muck sand, was the 
same as the material found on Mr. Noble's property. 
Would you disagree with him? 
A. I think Mr. Schoenfeld is a better authority on 
that than I am, Sir." 
Mr. Knowlton further testified that the property of Utah 
Sand and Gravel is located about a mile and a half south-
erly from the Noble property and on the East side of High-
way 91 (R. 350); that the witness' company excavated along 
the East side of Highway 91 to a depth of 40 feet below the 
level of the Highway, (R. 352); that the witness had been 
buying materials from Foss Lewis pit in Bountiful, which is 
about 8 miles away for 10 cents per ton, but this purchase 
was made under a 2 year contract which had since expired, 
(R. 353); the witness stated that the hauling price is about 
5¢ per ton-mile, and that the location of gravel property with 
respect to the market is an important item in connection 
10 
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with determining its value, (R. 359); and that most of the 
asphalt producers are located near North Salt Lake at the 
present time; that the Noble property is strategically located 
with respect to the industrial area of the city, (R. 360); the 
witness testified that he had negotiated with Mr. Noble for 
the purchase of some material and that the price at which 
it was offered was 20¢ per yard, (R. 353), and in declining 
to purchase, no objection was made as to the price, but in a 
letter, the witness wrote Mr. Noble in part as follows: 
"After giving further consideration to this mat-
ter, and also the fact that we understand the State 
Road Commission is intending soon to obtain right 
of way for the highway development in that neigh-
borhood, which will involve this property, we have 
decided that it would not be in our best interest to 
consider the purchase of any of this material from 
you at this time." 
The witness stated that he had recently negotiated with the 
State of Utah for certain blending sands on property to be 
acquired by the State just north of the Noble property, (R. 
355), and that he was particularly interested in the blending 
sand. 
Mr. Kiepe, the appraiser for the State, testified that 
the property had a multiple use, and that ultimately its 
highest and best use would be to preserve it for commercial 
development or industrial development which might properly 
expand along U. S. Highway 91, (R. 376); that the portion 
of the property which would have best use for business would 
be that frontage along the highway for a depth of 200 feet, 
(R. 382); that the witness made an estimate of replacement 
costs of the improvements to consider in connection with 
11 
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his estimate of value, (R. 370) and (R. 385); the witness' 
opinion as to how much sand and gravel could be economical-
ly removed from the property was 286,668 cubic yards, (R. 
386), which was considerably less than the 1,299,868 tons 
which the engineer calculated, (R. 387); that he did not 
consider it economically feasible to excavate below the grade 
line of the highway, (R. 387), East of the 200 foot depth; 
that the witness made an inquiry as to the value of sand 
and gravel and his opinion after inquiry was that the average 
price of all the material including sand and gravel was 10¢ 
per cubic yard in place, (R. 389); and on this basis, the pres-
ent worth of the sand and gravel is $14,540.00; that when 
the buildings were removed an additional $3,150.00 could 
be recovered from sand and gravel, (R. 391); that the front-
age property would be worth $92.00 per front foot in ten 
years from now, and would sell for $45,500.00, but the pre-
sent worth is $21,075.60 calculated by determining that 
the present worth of $45,500.00 ten years from now is 
$21,075.60, (R. 391); in summarizing, Mr. Kiepe determined 
the total value of the property as follows: (R. 392-393): 
a. Sand and gravel and 
overburden 
b. Sand and gravel where 
buildings are located 
c. Valuue of the land 
d. Rental income for 10 years 
at $2,700.00 per year; present 
cash value 
$14,540.00 
3,150.00 
21,075.00 
18,117.00 
Total $56,882.00 
The witness concluded that the fair market value was 
$56,900.00 according to his calculations, (R. 393) (Exhibit 
54). Upon cross examination the witness stated that he did 
not appraise the home separately, but that he estimated the 
12 
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replacement cost of the residence at $15,300.00 and a deprec-
iation of $3,060.00, leaving a present replacement cost less 
depreciation of $12,240.00 for the residence, (R. 404); that 
the witness obtained information on the business conducted 
on the premises for the years of 1952 and 1953, but did not 
get the figures for 1954 and 1955, (R. 404) ; that the witness 
determined the yardage of sand and gravel by using aU. S. 
Geological survey map (Exhibit 55) and by use of the con-
tour lines thereon, (R. 406); that on the map (Exhibit 55) 
the Noble property is indicated by about one half an inch, 
(R. 408); that though the witness said in order to appraise 
according to the rules of his organization, he had to do 
everything himself, in this instance he relied upon the map 
and accepted information from every source he could pos-
sibly glean as an appraiser, (R. 410); that the witness did 
not cross section the property himself and did no drilling, 
(R. 410); that the witness knew what type of material was 
on the Noble property "just by what is open", and that he 
inspected cuts on the Noble and adjoining properties, (R. 
415). As to the price of the sand and gravel, the witness ob-
tained all of his information from other people, (R. 418); 
that the witness based his opinion mainly on leases and con-
tracts that were made prior to 1954 or during 1954, (R. 419); 
that the witness knew that the great building program was 
to begin after 1955, (R. 420); that the witness realizes that 
hauling makes a tremendous difference in the price of sand 
and gravel and that where hauling costs 5¢ a ton mile, this 
becomes an important item, (R. 424); that with respect to 
the lateral support since the adjoining properties had a pri-
mary use for sand and gravel, the logical way for develop-
ment of the property and particularly the property to the 
East would be to develop it from the Noble property, (R. 
431 and 432). The witness stated that he was farniF"1' ,,,'t11 
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other properties along the highway and the vicinity of the 
Noble property, (R. 459); that he was acquainted with the 
property of Mayor Stewart, which adjoined the Noble prop-
erty immediately on the North, (R. 460); that Mayor Stew-
art's property was subject to a lease in favor of Mr. Schoen-
feld for 9lj2 years; and that there was an additional term to 
run on the lease of 5 years; (R. 461). The witness identified 
a deed from Mayor Stewart to the State Road Commission 
for 8.45 acres which showed a consideration of $80,000.00, 
(R. 462); that the State, in addition to paying Mayor Stew-
art $80,000.00 for the land, would still have to pay Mr. 
Schoenfeld for the 5 year lease, which Mr. Schoenfeld had on 
the sand and gravel, (R. 464) and much of the material had 
already been removed from the property. The deed from 
Mayor Stewart to the State Road Commission showing con-
sideration of $80,000.00 was offered and admitted in evidence 
as Exhibit 56 without objection, (R. 468). 
Mr. Solomon, the second appraiser called by the State, 
identified Exhibits 43 through 50 which are black and white 
prints of pictures taken by him, (R. 475); the witness est-
imated the quantities of sand and gravel as of July 1955, as 
follows: 
a. Overburden 41,127 cubic yards 
b. Muck sand 388,671 cubic yards, (R. 478). 
The witness testified that he first established the highest and 
best use for the property in which the highest and best use 
for the frontage property to a depth of 200 feet is for pres-
ervation for business use, and the balance of the property 
east of the 200 foot set back had the highest and best use for 
the extraction of deposits, (R. 479); that from the witness' 
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investigation, his opinion was that muck sand was worth 10¢ 
per cubic yard in place, and overburden was worth 4¢ per 
cubic yard in place, and these figures were determined by 
checking with operators who were buying and selling such 
products, (R.A81); the witness placed a value on the frontage 
property at $50.00 per foot to a depth of 200 feet, (R. 486); 
he placed a value of $1,250.00 on the right of way 50 feet in 
width on the north of the Noble property, (R. 487); the wit-
ness computed the cost of replacement of the improvements 
of Mr. Noble and allowed depreciation, (R. 488), making 
the depreciated value of the improvements $21,827.00, (R. 
489); the witness summarized his values of the property as 
follows: (R. 483-489), 
a. Frontage $29,750.00 (but at R.489-$28,750) 
b. Right of Way 1,250.00 
c. Improvements 21,827.00 
d. Gravel area 19,518.00 
$72,345.00 
The witness concluded that his opinion was that the market 
value of the property as of July 22, 1955, was $72,000.00, 
(R. 494). The witness further stated that he did not think 
the payment of $80,000.00 by the State Road Commission to 
Mayor Stewart was an excessive price, (R. 495). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
The Respondents statement of points are in the main 
the converse of the statement of points of the Appellant, and 
are set forth as follows: 
POINT I 
THE RESPO~ ~DENT SHOWED BY PREPONDERANCE 
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OF THE EVIDENCE THAT THE VALUE OF THE PROP-
ERTY TAKEN WAS AT LEAST $150,000.00 IN SUPPORT 
OF THE VERDICT OF THE JURY AND THE JUDGMENT 
ENTERED THEREON. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN ALLOWING EXPERTS TO 
TESTIFY AS TO THE MARKET VALUE OF THE PROP-
ERTY WHERE THE OPINION OF THE EXPERT WAS 
BASED PARTLY ON HIS OWN OBSERVATION AND 
PARTLY UPON INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY OTHERS, 
NOR WAS IT ERROR TO RECEIVE THE OPINION OF A 
WITNESS AS TO THE VALUE OF THE WHOLE PROPER-
TY BASED IN PART UPON HYPOTHETICAL QUES-
TIONS. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN ADMITTING THE COLORED PHOTOS IN EVIDENCE. 
POINT IV 
IT WAS NOT ERROR TO PERMIT THE JURY TO CON-
SIDER THE DEFENDANTS EXHIBIT NO. 56 UPON 
CROSS EXAMINATION OF THE PLAINTIFF'S WITNESS 
AS TO FAIR MARKET VALUE. 
POINTV 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN REFUSING TO STRIKE THE 
TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS HOWA AS TO THE 
MARKET VALUE OF SAND AND GRAVEL. 
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POINT VI 
THE JURY WAS FULLY INSTRUCTED UPON THE LAW 
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AND NONE OF WHICH IN-
STRUCTIONS WERE OBJECTED TO BY THE APPEL-
LANTS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE RESPONDENTS AGREE WITH THE APPELLANTS 
CONTENTION THAT THE BURDEN OF SHOWING DAM-
AGES RESTS UPON THE LAND OWNER, AND THE 
JURY WERE SO ADVISED BY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE 
COURT, (R. 45): 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
"You are instructed that the burden of proving value, 
and the burden of proving damages, are burdens which the 
law puts upon the defendants. These burdens of proof are 
successfully carried by defendants only if you find that 
they have established the truth of their contentions by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
A "preponderance of the evidence" is defined as that 
amount of evidence which is more convincing as to its truth, 
or which convinces the mind of the jury that a proposition 
is more probably true than not true. 
Therefore, if you believe that on a particular value the 
evidence is evenly balanced, then that value has not been 
proved, anu ~' -P-1 cannot award on that basis. The amount of 
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the market value that you find, must be supported by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence." 
The Utah Statute relative to compensation and damages 
and the assessment thereof as applied to a situation where 
the entire property is taken is as follows: 
"78-34-10. Compensation and damages- How 
assessed. - The court, jury or referee must hear 
such legal evidence as may be offered by any of the 
parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascer-
tain and assess: 
(1) The value of the property sought to be con-
demmed and all improvements thereon appertaining 
to the realty, and of each and every separate estate 
or interest therein; and if it consists of different par-
cels, the value of each parcel and of each estate or 
interest therein shall be separately assessed .... " 
All of the witnesses testifying as to the value of the 
whole of the property arrived at their estimates by consid-
ering three general components of value of the Respondent's 
property: 
a. Value of the 595 feet of frontage along the highway 
for a depth of about 190 to 200 feet. 
b. Value of the sand and gravel and overburden. 
c. Value of the improvements. 
All of the Respondent's witnesses used the computations 
made by Mr. Richards, the engineer, in determining the a-
mount of sand and gravel, which figures were: 
a. Fine sand, 355,222 tons. 
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b. Sand and gravel mixture, 944,646 tons. 
Total sand and gravel 1,299,868 tons. 
Mr. Keipe, by his own observation determined that there 
were 286,668 cubic yards of sand and gravel, (R. 386). At 
this point it should be mentioned that some witnesses use 
yardage as measurement, and others use tonnage. Mr. 
Schoenfeld, the sand and gravel operator, testified that one 
cubic yard of material weights from 2,200 to 3,000 lbs., and 
the rule-of-thumb is that 1 yard of material is about 1112 
tons, (R. 234). So that Mr. Kiepe's estimate of 286,668 cubic 
yards is about 430,002 tons. Mr. Solomon estimated the over-
burden at 41,127 cubic yards (61,790 tons) and muck sand 
of 388,671 cubic yards (583,006 tons), (R. 478), making 
about 644,796 tons in all. 
As to the value of the sand and gravel material, Mr. 
Schoenfeld testified that the fine sand was worth 25¢ per ton 
in place, and the remaining material would be worth 10¢ per 
ton in place, (R. 222); Mr. Howa stated the value was a min-
imum of 15¢ per yard for the entire run of material, (R. 
268); Mr. Noble testified that the sand was worth 25¢ per 
ton in place, and the sand and gravel 15¢ per ton in place, 
(R. 171) ; Mr. Knowlton, the sand and gravel man called by 
the State testified, that he had bought blending sand from 
Foss Lewis in Bountiful, which is about 8 miles away for 10¢ 
per ton under and old 2 year contract, (R. 353), and that 
the hauling price is about 5¢ per ton-mile, and that location 
of sand and gravel property with respect to the market is an 
important item in connection with determining its value, 
(R. 359); Mr. Knowlton classified muck sand as being that 
material which is washed off from the washing of his other 
sand and gravel materials, but even this washed off muck 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
sand was sold by him for 30¢ a ton loaded on the trucks, (R. 
356) ; Mr. Knowlton admitted that he had negotiated with 
Mr. Noble for the purchase of some material at the offered 
price of 20¢ per yard, (R. 353), and at no time did Mr. 
Knowlton make known to Mr. Noble that the reasons for 
discontinuing negotiations was a matter of price, (R. 367), 
and the only reason given was as set forth in exhibits 52 and 
53 which is in part quoted in the Statement of Facts (supra). 
Mr. Kiepe placed a market value of 10¢ per cubic yard for all 
of the material in place, (R. 389); Mr. Solomon testified that 
the muck sand was worth 10¢ per cubic yard in place, 
(R. 481). 
In summary, the jury in determining the value of the 
sand and gravel had the following testimony: 
Respondent's Witnesses: 
Fine Sand 355,222 tons @ .25 
Sand & Gravel 944,646 tons @ .10 
1,299,868 tons Total 
Mr. Kiepe: 
$ 88,805.50 
94,464.60 
$183,270.10 
Sand & Gravel 286,668 yards @ .10 $ 28,666.80 
( 430,002 tons) 
Mr. Solomon: 
Fine Sand 
Overburden 
But present cash value $ 17,690.00 
388,671 yards @ .10 
41,127 yards @ .04 
( 644,796 tons) 
$ 38,867.10 
1,645.08 
$ 40,316.08 
But present cash value $ 19,518.00 
Mr. Kiepe and Mr. Solomon apparently calculated the 
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amount of material by estimating the amount within a cone 
shaped excavation leaving lateral support on four sides and 
going to a depth of about the level of the highway, in disre-
gard of the evidence that by agreement and custom the only 
lateral support necessary would be that which adjoins the 
east side of the 200 foot commercial property. Mr. Knowl-
ton, the Appellant's witness, testified that his firm had ex-
cavated to a depth of about 40 feet below the level of High-
way 91 in the vicinity of the highway, (R. 352). Mr. Knowl-
ton never did testify as to the market value of the material 
in place, but did state that he had been paying 10¢ per ton 
for the material at Bountiful, and hauling at a distance of 
7 miles greater at a cost of 5¢ per ton-mile, which in itself 
was 35¢ per ton for haulage alone in excess of the haul which 
would have been required had he purchased the material 
from the Noble property, (R. 353 and 359). 
The frontage property of the defendants consisted of 
595 feet along U. S. Highway 91, together with a 50 foot 
right-of-way adjoining thereto, but the latter right-of-way 
was not a part of the litigation herein. All of the experts a-
greed that a good depth for commercial or industrial prop-
erty would be from 190 to 200 feet East of the highway. As 
to the values placed upon the frontage property, the opinions 
were as follows: 
Mr. Gaddis, $75.00 per front foot $44,625.00 
Mr. Rideout, $75.00 per front foot $44,625.00 
Mr. Keipe stated the property would be worth $92.00 per 
front foot in 10 years from now making it $54,740, but that 
the present worth is $21,075.60. (R. 391). 
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Mr. Solomon, $50.00 per front foot $29,750.00 
(R. 486), but (R. 489), he shows the total for the land is 
$28,750.00 instead of $29,750.00, (R. 489). 
The improvements including the residence on the prop-
erty had been blue printed in great detail by Mr. Howa, a 
Civil Engineer, who determined the replacement costs at a 
total of $44,795.00, and that the depreciation on these im-
provements was $4,000.00, making a replacement value less 
depreciation of $40,795.00. Mr. Gaddis and Mr. Rideout in 
answer to the hypothetical questions placed to them, stated 
that from their general observation of the property during 
prior years, and from viewing pictures, and from considering 
the testimony of Mr. Howa that the replacement value was 
$44,795.00 less $4,000.00 depreciation; that the witnesses 
considered these matters in forming their opinion of the val-
ue of the whole property. 
Mr. Kiepe testified that he had made an estimate of the 
cost of replacement of the improvements to check another 
method which he uses for valuation, (R. 370 and 385); that 
he estimated the replacement cost of the residence at 
$15,300.00 and the depreciation of $3,060.00 leaving a pre-
sent replacement cost less depreciation of $12,240.00 for the 
residence, (R. 404); however, rather than place a value on 
the improvements as such, the witness under his method of 
appraisal determined a rental income for 10 years of the prop-
erty at $2,700.00 per year which would have a present value 
of $18,117.00. Mr. Solomon explained in detail his method of 
appraising the value of the improvements, and his procedure 
was to estimate the replacement costs and allow a reasonable 
depreciation, (R. 489 to 492). Mr. Solomon gave the deprec-
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iated replacement costs of the improvements as follows: 
DEPRECIATED 
RELACEMENT REPLACEMENT 
COST VALUE 
Home (R. 491) $15,400.00 
Antique Repair Shop (R. 492) 
Laundry Room (R. 492) 
Antique Building (R. 492) 
Trailer Court, sewage & power (R. 492) 
Total 
$10,797.00 
1,878.00 
1,920.00 
3,532.00 
3,200.00 
$21,267.00 
The foregoing total appears to be $21,267.00, but Mr. Sol-
omon had stated a total of $21, 827.00, (R. 492). It is appar-
ent that Mr. Solomon used the figure of $21,827.00 for the 
improvements in coming up with his overall total of 
$72,345.00, (supra 15). Mr. Solomon endeavored to explain 
the difference between fair market value and replacement 
cost, and did in fact distinquish between the two, but in 
this instance it is obvious that he himself considered the 
depreciated replacement cost as the market value. 
The court instructed the jury as to evidence of replace-
ment value as follows: 
"You have heard evidence of "replacement val-
ue". Replacement value is what new buildings would 
cost on today' s prices of the same type of rna terials, 
or it may be what second-hand buildings of the same 
type would cost, if they could be placed on the prop-
erty. The defendants are not entitled to replacement 
values as such. 
Depreciation was given to you as the measure of 
the extent of the wear and tear on the buildings. De-
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predation is not necesarily the difference between 
replacement cost and market value. You may, how-
ever, consider replacement costs and the depreciation 
figure as elements to be considered in determining 
what a willing buyer would have paid for the entire 
property, it being sold by a willing seller." 
The detailed discussion concerning replacement costs 
and its relation to fair market value in the examination and 
cross examination of several of the witnesses would seem 
to have fully informed the jury that replacement costs can 
be considered in determining value, but are not necesarily 
conclusive thereof, and the fact that Mr. Solomon, the Appel-
lant's witness, apparently relied entirely upon the deprec-
iated replacement cost method, the jury could well have con-
sidered the values placed by Mr. Howa as being more exact 
because of his more detailed examination and determination 
of costs. 
In summary the jury had the following to consider in 
connection with determining the fair market value of the 
property. 
Respondents' witnesses: 
Frontage: 595 feet @ $75.00 
Improvements: 
Sand & Gravel: 
$ 44,625.00 
40,999.00 
183,269.10 
$268,925.10 
Mr. Noble testified that his opinion of the market value 
of the property was $300,000.00. 
Appellant's witnesses: 
Mr. Kiepe: 
a. Sand and gravel and overburden $14,540.00 
24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
b. Sand and gravel where buildings are 
located 
c. Value of the land 
d. Rental income for 10 years at 
$2,700.00 per year 
Mr. Solomon: 
a. Frontage 
b. Right of Way 
c. Improvements 
d. Gravel area 
3,150.00 
21,075.00 
18,117.00 
$56,882.00 
$28,750.00 
1,250.00 
21,827.00 
19,518.00 
$71,345.00 
From the evidence presented, the jury could well have 
found the fair market value of the Defendants' property to 
be in excess of $268,000.00, but in its determination it consid-
ered the value of the property at $150,000.00 which seems to 
be fully and amply supported by the evidence. 
The Defendants are entitled to have the evidence, and 
all reasonable inferences therefrom, considered in the light 
most favorable to them. This court has repeatedly held that 
if there is any substantial evidence supporting the finding of 
the Trier of Fact it will not be disturbed on appeal. Malstrom 
v. Consolidated Theatres Inc., 4 Utah 2nd 181, 290 Pacific 
2nd 689; Beck v. Jeppesen, 1 Utah 2nd 127, 262 Pacific 2nd 
760; and a great number of other cases decided by this court. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN ALLOWING EXPERTS TO 
TESTIFY AS TO THE MARKET VALUE OF THE PROP-
ERTY WHERE THE OPINION OF THE EXPERT WAS 
BASED PARTLY ON HIS OWN OBSERVATION AND 
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PARTLY UPON INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY OTHERS, 
NOR WAS IT ERROR TO RECEIVE THE OPINION OF A 
WITNESS AS TO THE VALUE OF THE WHOLE PROP-
ERTY BASED IN PART UPON HYPOTHETICAL QUEST-
IONS. 
The procedure followed by the expert witnesses of the 
Defendants, was essentially the same procedure followed 
by the experts testifying for the Appellants as hereto-
fore discussed, excepting that the experts for the Appel-
lants undertook to determine for themselves certain tech-
nical data such as the quantity and quality of material, 
and by inquiry from others determined the price or value 
of such material. Mr. Gaddis and Mr. Rideout gave their 
own observation and in part upon a hypothetical ques-
tion. The trial court properly instructed the jury in con-
nection with the opinion of experts based upon hypothet-
ical questions as follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 24 
"Some of the experts in testifying as to the val-
ue of all of the Noble property, based their opinions, 
in part, upon certain hypothetical questions; that is 
to say, their opinion was based upon the information 
and findings of others which the expert assumed to 
be correct. You are instructed that you give weight 
to the opinion of an expert based upon these assump-
tions, to the extent that the assumptions are sup-
ported by a preponderance of the evidence in this 
case." 
All of the experts acknowledged that the value of the 
whole property must be determined by consideration of its 
compm~ 'nt parts. The Appellant's witness obtained their 
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information on those component parts with which they were 
not familiar by inquiry from persons outside of the court-
room, whereas the Respondent's experts based their opin-
ions upon information of other experts which was given in 
open court under strict cross examination. 
The Appellants cite State v. Tedesco, 4 Utah 2nd 248, 
as opposing the procedure used by the Respondents' expert 
witnesses. In that case, the objection was that the experts 
assigned the retail value to individual lots in a subdivision 
and multiplied the number of lots by the retail value with-
out allowing for any costs; however, no such circumstance 
was present in the trial of the subject case since the values 
assigned to the various types of sand and gravel were values 
of the material in place, and the retail values of said mater-
ials were substantially greater as testified by Mr. Schoen-
feld and Mr. Knowlton. Mr. Schoenfeld testified that he sold 
the fine sand for 75¢ per yard at the plant site after a load-
ing cost of about 10¢ per yard, (R. 221). 
The annotation on minerals in land as evidence of value 
in 156 ALR 1416 states that with remarkable unanimity the 
courts hold that in determining the compensation in eminent 
domain proceedings, the existence of valuable mineral depos-
its in the land taken, constitutes an element which may 
be taken into consideration if and insofar as it influenc-
es the market value of the land. The reason for the 
rule is that the measure of compensation in eminent domain 
proceedings is the market value of the land to be condemned 
as a whole with due consideration of all the component parts 
that make for its value. Then at page 1422 of said annota-
tion, it states that if land containing minerals can be put to 
two uses, which are inconsistent, the owner is entitled tore-
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cover for the more valuable use but not for both; but if the 
uses are not incompatible, both uses may be considered in 
fixing the market value. In the instant case there was no dis-
agreement that the property was conducive to a commercial 
use as well as a sand and gravel business. 
A well considered federal case dealing with the general 
problem of valuating property by considering the valuation 
of various part, is the case of Cade V. United States, 213 F. 
2nd, 138, U. S. Court of Appeals, 4th Ctr. 
The landowner appealed from judgment of the district 
court contending the award was inadequate, and that the 
court erred in striking testimony of an expert who testified 
as to value of the whole of the land after giving valuation to 
the various parts, and that the court erred in excluding tes-
timony as to value of a deposit of granite rock on land. In 
reversing the cause, the court held in part as follows: 
(140) " ..... the trial judge on motion of the gov-
ernment struck out his (expert witness) testimony 
on the ground that the overall value to which he 
had testified had been arrived at by adding to-
gether the values he had placed upon the various 
items." 
"This, we think, was error." 
" ..... The witness testified to the value of the 
land as a whole after giving the valuation which he 
had placed upon the various parts. This is the way 
that any man of intelligence would have arrived at 
a valuation of the property for ordinary bus!'1ess 
purposes, and we know of no reason why a wit.u2ss 
testifying under oath as to his opinions s110 ;\l pf\t 
arrive at a valuation in the same way ..... 
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"In United States vs. Wise, 4 Cir., 131 F. 2nd 
851 this court held admissible evidence as to repro-
duction cost of structural improvements on proper-
ty condemned. . . . " 
Quoting from Clark v. United States, 8 Cir. 155 F. 2nd 
157, 162 the court said: "We think it was prejudicial not to 
permit defendant's witnesses to tell the jury what part of 
the value he placed on the timber land and what part on the 
rest of the land. In eminent domain proceedings the rule is 
that all facts which an ordinary prudent man would take 
into account before forming a judgment as to the market 
value of property he contemplates purchasing is relevant and 
rna terial. . . . . " 
In holding error to exclude the testimony of value of the 
granite deposit, the court quoted from National Brick Co. 
v. United States, 76 U. S. App. D. C., 329, 131 F 2nd 30, 
where the trial court had refused to admit testimony as to 
the value of sand on the land: 
"This opinion of the Court was, of course, wrong, 
for no rule is better established than that the special 
value of land due to its adaptability for use in a par-
ticular business is an element which the owner is 
entitled to have considered in determining the 
amount to be paid in just compensation. So much was 
said by the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 341. And we know of no other evi-
dence by which the jury could be properly guided in 
_ determining the value of the property than to be 
told the per ton value of the sand as it lay, or, with-
out this knowledge, how the jury could ever have 
reached a judgment based on anything more than 
guess or speculation." 
(Emphasis added) 
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A simular result was reached in the case of Early v. 
South Carolina Public Service Authority, S.C., 90S. E. 2nd 
472, a case in which the appellant by diverting fresh 
water caused salt water to flood upon respondent's land. 
The respondent called several witnesses, some of whom test-
ified to value of land before and after flooding with salt 
water and some of whom testified as to amount of land in-
volved, to which the appellant objected. The court held: 
(480) 
"There was before the jury evidence in the form 
of the plat and the testimony of Mr. McCrady as to 
the number of acres involved; and only a simple 
mathematical calculation was required to translate 
the testimony of these witnesses . . . into the terms 
of damage to the whole area involved. The fact that 
property taken should be valued as a whole for the 
purpose of assessing compensation for the taking 
"does not preclude the admission of testimony show-
ing paticular elements of value for consideration 
by the jury in arriving at the overall value which 
they are required to find as the basis of compensa-
tion." 
POINT ill 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN ADMITTING THE COLORED PHOTOS IN EVIDENCE. 
The Appellants contend that is was error for the 
court to admit in evidence exhibits No. 28 through 41 
which are enlargements of photographs taken in the col-
ored film; however exhibits No. 21 through 27 are black 
and white photo prints of essentially the same scenes as the 
colored pictures and both the black and white prints and 
the colored photos were offered by the Respondents for 
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consideration of the jury at the same time. These exhibits 
were identified by Mr. Noble who under cross examination 
admitted that the photos were a true picture except for the 
tinted trees and some purplish tint on objects in the photo, 
(R. 148). The jury were also given exhibits No. 43 through 
50, which were black and white prints of pictures taken 
by Mr. Solomon, (R. 475). The jury was given every op-
portunity to compare the colored photos with those black 
and white ones, and as stated by Mr. Gaddis, the colored 
photos are no more or less a true representation than the 
black and white photos, but are representative. 
The main objection of the appellants to the colored 
photos seems to be that they are misleading, and on this 
point Whigmore on evidence, Vol. III, section 792, page 
185 states: 
"Occasionally a Court is found excluding a 
photograph as being misleading; but this is begging 
the very question which the jury have to decide; it 
would be as anomalous as if the judge were to order 
a witness from the stand because he was believed by 
the judge to be lying." 
In view of the lengthy cross examination concerning 
the colored photos, and that the jury had an opportunity to 
compare the colored and black and white photos as well as to 
view the premises, it appears clear that the court did not 
abuse its discretion in allowing the colored photos to be ad-
mitted in evidence. 
POINT IV 
IT WAS NOT ERROR TO PERMIT THE JURY TO CON-
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SIDER THE DEFENDANTS EXHffiiT NO. 56 UPON 
CROSS EXAMINATION OF THE PLAINTIFF'S WIT-
NESS AS TO FAIR MARKET VALUE. 
Mr. Kiepe was the Appellant's witness who was being 
cross examined by the Respondent. Mr. Kiepe stated that 
he had checked the sales of all land in the vicinity of the 
Noble property and he knew what they sold for, (R. 459); 
that he was well versed in prices which had been paid for 
properties along that highway. Mr. Kiepe was then asked if 
he knew what the Valentine property sold for, and then 
whether he appraised Mayor Stewart's property which was 
immediately North of the Noble property, and he replied 
that he had so appraised the Stewart property, (R. 460); 
that the sale-by lVIayor Stewart to the State Road Commis-
sion was a negotiated sale, (R. 463); that in paying Mr. 
Stewart $80,000.00 for the tract which was subject to a lease 
with 61;2 years remaining, (R. 465) the State paid too much 
for the Stewart land, (R. 466). Then the deed from Mayor 
Stewart to the State Road Commission was marked as Ex-
hibit 56, and was admitted in evidence without objection. 
(R. 468); nor did the appellant object to any of the cross 
examination in this connection; furthermore on redirect 
examination of Mr. Kiepe, the Appellants undertook a de-
tailed examination concerning the sale of the Stewart prop-
erty to the State Road Commission, (R. 469). On direct ex-
amination by the Appellant of Mr. Solomon, (R. 494), Mr. 
Solomon stated that he appraised the Stewart property; that 
the witness appraised the Stewart Property for $80,000.00, 
and that this was not an excessive price, (R. 495) ; that the 
Stewart property had 1325 feet or so frontage as compared 
with 595 feet of frontage on the Noble property, (R.495). It 
;~s to be noted at this point that the Stewart property was 
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subject to a lease having about 6¥2 years remaining in favor 
of Mr. Schoenfeld who had the right to remove the sand 
and gravel therefrom, and the $80,000.00 was only a pay-
ment for the fee subject to said lease. 
The Appellant cites the case of Weber County et al. v. 
Ritchie, App. Br. 27 as authority that the court erred in per-
mitting the jury to consider Exhibit No. 56. However, that 
case is distinguished from this one in two important partic-
ulars: 
First, in that case the evidence was offered in direct 
examination by the land owner whereas in the instant case, 
the testimony was on cross examination of Mr. Kiepe by 
~ 
Respondent and direct examination of Mr. Solomon by the 
Appellant. 
Secondly, in the Weber County case a more serious ob-
jection to the testimony of similar sales was that the par-
ticular sale which it was sought to introduce in evidence in-
cluded not only sale price but damages as well. 
This court in the case of State vs. Peek, 1 Utah 2nd, 
263, 265 Pacific 2nd, 630, held that the price paid for similar 
lands is admissible in evidence both on direct examination 
and cross examination. While the Peek case does not pass 
directly upon the question as to whether or not evidence as 
to the price paid by condemner for similar property is ad-
missible, yet the court's opinion would seem to indicate that 
upon cross examination of a witness as to his opinion of val-
ue of property as long as it tends to disclose the truth, the 
inquiry should be allowed and should never be curtailed or 
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California, in the case of the City of Los Angeles v. 
Cole, 170 Pacific 2nd, 928 while holding that the price paid 
by the condemner for other property is not a proper basis 
for determining market value, further commented (Page 
933) as follows: 
"(10) Nor does the record sustain appellants' ob-
jection that these instructions were prejudicial be-
cause in their statement of the law they did not con-
tain the additional rule announced in the Brizzolara 
case supra 100 Cal. at page 437, 34 P. at page 1084, 
that while evidence of the character specified is not 
admissible as evidence in chief, such evidence is ad-
missible by way of cross-examination "for the pur-
pose of testing the fairness or honesty of an opinion 
which the witness may have given upon his direct ex-
amination, in relation to the value of the property in-
volved in the action." As heretofore noted in the 
present action such testimony was permitted on 
cross-examination of respondent's witness, and in a 
separate instruction the court advised the jury as to 
the propriety of their taking such testimony into con-
sideration for the aforsaid limited purpose-its im-
peaching effect. Reclamation District No. 730 v. 
Inglin, 31 Cal. App. 495,500 160 P. 1098 and cases 
therein cited." 
In this case no objection having been made to the trial 
court concerning Exhibit 56; and Mr. Kiepe having been 
confronted with this matter on cross-examination with the 
full opportunity to explain his appraisal and opinion of the 
transaction; and the fact the the Appellants on direct exam-
ination of Mr. Solomon elicited from Mr. Solomon the test-
imony that the Stewart property was appraised by Mr. Sol-
omon for $80,000.00 and that he thought it was a fair price, 
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(R.495) there could have been no error committed in con-
nection with the introduction of Exhibit 56. 
POINT V 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN REFUSING TO STRIKE THE 
TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS HOWA AS TO THE 
MARKET VALUE OF SAND AND GRAVEL. 
The Appellants quote in their brief only part of the 
testimony of Mr. Howa relative to his knowledge of the value 
of sand and gravel. Commencing at R. 258 and continuing 
toR. 268, the record shows that the Appellants cross exam-
ined Mr. Howa at length, and he testified that he was a 
building contractor as well as an engineer and estimator; 
that he had purchased about 5,000 yards of sand and gravel 
and concrete aggregate last year; that he determined the 
price of sand and gravel by calling firms such as Utah Sand 
& Gravel or Gibbons and Reed, (R. 267); that the witness 
realized that the construction of a plant for processing the 
sand and gravel would be necessary, and that the witness 
had built a sewage plant where the cost of washing sand 
for baffle was a part of his experience, and he took all of 
these matters into consideration in determining the value 
of the sand and gravel on the Noble property. Then when 
asked by Mr. Budge what he thought the material was 
worth in place, the witness stated that he would give for 
sand and gravel in place a minimum of 15¢ per yard, (R. 
268). Mr. Howa had considerably more background in sand 
and gravel, than did the witnesses Mr. Solomon and Mr. 
Kiepe, who were presented by the Appellants as experts for 
the purpose of appraising sand and gravel property. Mr. 
Kiepe and Mr. Solomon both testified that they obtained 
their information ·upon the price of sand and gravel by 
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making inquiry from various operators, while Mr. Howa in 
addition to this procedure of inquiry had himself been ex-
perienced in purchasing and dealing with these products as 
a builder and engineer as well as estimator. 
The Appellant cites Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First 
National Bank Bldg. Co., 89 U 456, 57 Pacific 2nd, 1099. 
This was a case where the plaintiff sought damages for the 
removal of what was a party wall situation, and the witness 
Richards was called as an expert on the difference between 
the value of the building before and after demolition of the 
partition wall. Comments 17 to 34 deal with this proposition 
and the Appellants quoted only a part of what was there 
said by the court. The court further held "The matter of 
determining the qualification of a witness to testify as to 
value rests largely in the discretion of the court. City of 
Geneseo v. Schultz, 257 Ill. 273, 100 N.E. 926. The discretion 
exercised will not be disturbed except for palpable error." 
This court held in the case of Salt Lake & Utah Rail-
road Co. v. Schramm et al., 56 Utah 53, 58, 189 Pac. 90, 
regarding opinion evidence as follows: 
"In cases like the one under consideration the 
qualification of witnesses to express an opinion as 
to market value necessarily is a question to be large-
ly determined by the trial judge. If it is shown that 
the witness is competent to express an opinion as to 
values, no matter what the source of the qualifying 
information may be, he should be permitted to test-
ify. The sources of the witnesses' information may 
vary according to the peculiar means or opportunity 
the witness has of forming an opinion and judging 
the premises. We do not think any good reason can 
be assigned why a l-tl'son who has occupied and used 
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the premises all her life, and has been interested and 
alert in making inquiry as to its value, may not be as 
well qualified to speak as the banker, lawyer, or 
real estate man, having more or less to do with the 
sales and transfers of real property. The means and 
extent of the knowledge of any witness may be gone 
into on cross-examination, and rebutted by the test-
testimony of other competent witnesses, whose opin-
ions may differ as to value. No rule can be formu-
lated for determing the means by which a witness 
shall acquire the necessary knowledge to qualify him 
to speak that will apply in all cases. If, under all the 
circumstances, he was in a position to obtain know-
ledge and form a correct judgment as to values, 
whether or not by buying, selling, leasing, or using 
the property for purposes for which it is adaptable 
is immaterial, so long as the jury is given the benefit 
of the facts upon which the opinion of the witness 
is based. Salt Lake Inv. Co. v. 0. S. L. R. Co., 46 
Utah, 203, 148 Pac. 439; Montana Ry. Co. v. Warren, 
137 U.S. 348, 11 Sup. Ct. 96, 34 L. Ed. 681; 2 Lewis, 
Eminent Domain (3d Ed.) section 656." 
This holding was also followed in the case of Provo River 
Water Users Association v. Carlson 103 U 93, 133 Pacif-
ic 2nd 777, at page 782, and the court further stated "The 
limited experiences of the witness might tend to deprec-
iate the weight of their testimony, but it would not make 
them incompetent to testify if they were acquainted with 
land values." 
POINT VI 
THE JURY WAS FULLY INSTRUCTED UPON THE LAW 
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AND NONE OF WHICH IN-
STRUCTIONS WERE OBJECTED TO BY THE APPEL-
LANTS. 
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The jury was fully instructed by the court in the matter 
of determining the amount of compensation due the Defend-
ants, (R. 41-59). By Instruction No. 3, the court instructed 
the jury that they are to determine the fair market value 
as of July 22, 1955, of the property taken by the State. 
The following instructions or excerpts from instructions 
are quite pertinent: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
"Your are not to consider what the property was 
worth to the defendants for speculation, or merely 
for possible uses, nor what they claim it was worth 
to them, nor can you consider what it may be worth 
to plaintiff for highway purposes, nor what the prop-
erty would bring at a forced sale, you are not to con-
sider the price the property would sell for under 
special or extraordinary circumstances, but only its 
fair market value on July 22, 1955, if offered in the 
market under ordinary circumstances for cash, a 
reasonable time being given to make the sale." 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
"It is your sworn duty to fix the just compen-
sation due defendants in accordance with the evi-
dence given in this case, being guided by the legal 
definition of that term, and by the rules of law which 
the Court will give you in these instructions. You are 
bound by your oaths to receive the law as it is laid 
down by the Court, even though it may not accord 
with your own view as to what the law is or should 
be." 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
"You are instructed that defendants are entitled 
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I~ 
to just compensation on account of the taking of 
their property. It is the duty of the jury to deter-
mine what amount of money will constitute just 
compensation, as that term is defined in these in-
structions. 
In this case, "just compensation" is the fair 
market value of the property taken from defend-
ants." 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
1~ "As to the meaning of "Market Value", the 
~~ market value of property taken for public use is the 
price estimated in terms of money which the prop-
perty would bring if offered for sale in the open 
market with a reasonable time allowed in which to 
find a purchaser, buying with the knowledge of all 
the uses and purposes to which it was adapted and 
for which it was capable; or as otherwise state, it is 
the price the property will bring when offered for 
sale by one who desires, but is not required, to sell, 
and is sought by one who has the cash, and who de-
sires, but is not required, to buy, after due consid-
eration of all the elements reasonably affecting 
value." 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
"It would be unjust to the public that the State 
should be required to pay the defendants more than a 
fair market value for the loss they sutain by the ap-
propriation of their property for the general good." 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
"The term "just compensation" means "just" 
not only to the party whose property is taken for 
public use, but also "just" to the public which is to 
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pay for it." 
INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
"The defendants were entitled to sell the land 
and buildings on the theory that said land could be 
used for the best and most profitable purpose or 
purposes, for which it was adapted. They could have 
sold it on the theory that it was usable for several 
purposes, but you must consider or assume that the 
entire tract of land, including the frontage, trailer 
courts, antique store, and the sand and gravel de-
posits, would have sold to one man for whatever 
use or uses he could make of it. 
You may not consider uncertain, remote or spec-
ulative, or imaginary uses, but only those elements 
which give the property a market value, or which 
reduce its market value. One way to do it would be 
to suppose a sale by a willing seller to a willing buy-
er, neither one being forced into the transaction, the 
buyer having the money to buy, and then determine 
what he would have paid for it in the light of all of 
the evidence in this case." 
INSTRUCTION NO. 23 
"The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit 
the opinion of a witness to be received as evidence. 
An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert 
witnesses. A person who, by education, study and ex-
perience has become an expert in any art, science 
occupation or profession, and who is called as a wit-
ness, may give his opinion as to any such matter in 
which he is versed and which is material to the case. 
You should consider such expert opinion and should 
weight the reasons, if any, given for it. You are not 
bound, however, by such an opinion. Give it the 
weight to which you deem it entitled, whether that 
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be great or slight, and you may reject it, if, in your 
judgment, the reasons given for it are unsound." 
CONCLUSIONS 
From the foregoing review, we are of the opinion that 
the evidence fairly and reasonably adduced at trial would 
have supported and justified a verdict and judgment of near-
ly twice the amount entered, and the verdict and judgment 
below should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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